Free will problem. Consequence argument

15 June, 2018

We begin to publish the best sessions from the summer school on Free will and Moral responsibility we held this summer. The first session is devoted to the famous “Consequence argument” of Peter Van Inwagen.

This August we held a summer school on “Free will and Moral responsibility” led by professor John M. Fischer. Now we have begun to publish the best sessions from that summer school. The first session is devoted to the famous “Consequence argument” of Peter Van Inwagen (in the photo). This argument defines free will as the ability to do otherwise, and it claims that if determinism is true, then we can’t do otherwise and there is only one consequence entailed by previous events. Hence free will is incompatible with determinism; and so, given determinism, we don’t have free will.

Part 1

Part 2

More on this topic


Mind, Brain and Free Will. Research Seminar of the Center for Consciousness Studies

The seminar has been devoted to the book of the distinguished Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne “Mind, Brain and Free Will”. Swinburn takes an unpopular position for nowdays, defending the subs...
May 2018

Conference on The Personal Identity Problem. Recordings of the Presentations

The problem of personal identity is one of the most discussed in contemporary philosophy. It includes questions about the Self, personality, its identity in time and its unity. On May 17, 2018 at...
May 2018