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According to Merricks, many of the contemporary authors exploring the problem of identity in time usually focus on one of two rarely distinguished issues: either the normative question of what is important for the survival of the individual, or the metaphysical question of how the current person should be in relation to the future in order for it to be considered a survivor who has what matters for survival.
According to Merricks, when answering the first question, philosophers often point to a special sense of concern about whether the experience of a future identity will be good or bad, which a person can only experience in relation to his own future, and this kind of answer usually leads to the recognition that the numerical identity of a personality does not matter for survival. However, this does not mean that it is completely irrelevant to the problem of survival: Merricks seeks to show that pointing to the numerical identity of a person is the best answer to the second of the indicated questions. If this is true, then, while not being something that is directly relevant to survival, the numerical identity of a person is what ensures that there is something that is of such immediate importance. We discuss the credibility of the argument presented by Merricks at our seminar. Andrey Mertsalov presents the author's central ideas, and Taras Tarasenko critically analyzes them; then there is a discussion.
The participants of the discussion: Oksana Cherkashina, Evgeny Loginov, Ivan Devyatko, Artyom Yashin, Vadim Vasilyev, Artyom Besedin.
