Kuznetsov’s article considers Ned Block’s well-known distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. In contrast to Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, as described by Block, does not present an apparently intractable problem. However, it raises separate issues which are ignored by most reductionist theories. Block thinks we should stop to confuse phenomenal and access consciousness and then the future progress of science will be able to explain what phenomenal consciousness is by studying its function. While emphasizing that access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness are in fact two separate types of consciousness, Block argues for the presence of access consciousness without phenomenal consciousness and for the converse. Kuznetsov accepts access consciousness without phenomenal consciousness, but he rejects the idea that one could have phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness. This idea is contradictory. Therefore he concludes that study of phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness is unlikely to be a promising research strategy.